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Transnational expertise and the expansion
of the international tax regime: imposing
‘acceptable’ standards
Martin Hearson
London School of Economics and Political Science, International Relations, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Global economic governance outcomes in areas such as corporate taxation
may be influenced by transnational policy communities acting at national
and transnational levels. Yet, while transnational tax policy processes are
increasingly analyzed through the politics of expertise, national preferences
have usually been derived from domestic interest group preferences. We
know little about how technical expertise interacts with interest group pol-
itics at national level, an important deficit given the sovereignty-preserving,
decentralized way in which transnational tax norms become hard law. This
article examines the drivers of expansion of the UK’s bilateral tax treaty net-
work in the 1970s, which cannot be explained solely through monolithic
interest group politics. Evidence from the British national archives demon-
strates how tax experts in the civil service and the private sector, members
of a transnational policy community, used tax treaties to impose OECD
standards for taxing British firms on host countries, at times overruling the
preferences of other political, bureaucratic and business actors. Expertise
politics and business power may shape the development of norms and
focal points within a transnational policy community, but it is often their
interaction at domestic level that determines the implementation of trans-
national norms as hard law.
KEYWORDS Transnational policy communities; developing countries; foreign direct investment;
taxation; United Kingdom; bilateral tax treaties
Introduction
The political debate around the international tax regime that has emerged in
recent years focuses on a popular perception that it is far too vulnerable to
tax avoidance and evasion (Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Christians, 2010c;
Eccleston & Smith, 2016; Hakelberg, 2016; OECD, 2013; Rixen, 2008a;
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Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016), which occur through Global Wealth Chains
(Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017). Two views in IPE scholarship explain how this
situation arose. In the first, state-centric, view, the problem is one of path-
dependence. States became locked in to the sovereignty-preserving, self-
enforcing design of a regime designed to prevent double taxation, which
made it harder for them to deal with the prisoners’ dilemma of tax competi-
tion that enabled tax avoidance and evasion (Genschel & Rixen, 2015;
Picciotto, 1992; Rixen, 2011; Sharman, 2006). In the second, transnational
view, a community of tax negotiators and tax professionals shielded from pol-
itical attention elaborated a complex set of technical standards aimed at mini-
mizing double taxation, then defended the integrity of these standards when
outsiders proposed radical reforms to resolve the avoidance and evasion
problems (Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Grinberg, 2017; Picciotto, 2015;
Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016; Yl€onen & Teivainen, 2017).
These accounts are not mutually exclusive, and combining them offers a
missing piece in the puzzle: the role of expertise in national preference for-
mation. Scholarship examining the national political economy of international
tax rules is limited to only a few examples (Barthel & Neumayer, 2012; Eden,
Dacin, & Wan, 2001; Sadiq, 2012),1 yet the international tax norms that are
the focus of transnational accounts only become tax law when they are
adopted by national governments, as the hard law of bilateral tax treaties and
national tax codes (Christians, 2007). In the state-centric view, in contrast,
national preferences are a function of the aggregate welfare implications and
interest group politics concerned with the tax-driven effects of investment
promotion and revenue raising (Dietsch & Rixen, 2016; Hakelberg, 2016;
Rixen, 2011). Corporate capital has a clear interest in the elimination of dou-
ble taxation, while there is no organized lobby against it. As a result, states
are expected to have a first-order preference for stimulating trade and invest-
ment by concluding tax treaties that eliminate double taxation, and a second-
order one for sacrificing as little tax revenue as possible when doing so
(Chisik & Davies, 2004; Rixen, 2011; Rixen & Schwarz, 2009).
The UK is an archetypal case of tax treaty diffusion, having been an active
participant in the multilateral level of the regime since its inception (Avery
Jones, 2011) and concluding more bilateral tax treaties than any other state.
It was in negotiations with 38 states outside the OECD during the 1970s. Yet
some of its negotiating decisions during this time, notably to walk away from
talks with Brazil, were taken against strong political pressure generated by
industry lobby groups. A closer look at the process of preference formation
shows that it was dominated by members of a transnational policy commu-
nity (Tsingou, 2014), whose members had shaped a focal point, the OECD
model convention, over decades. They used their roles in the domestic setting
to translate the standards embodied by the OECD model into a wide network
of bilateral tax treaties. Political pressure on treaty negotiators came from
actors in government and business, not all of whom took for granted the aim
of adherence to the OECD model. This led to heterogeneous preferences and
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influencing capabilities among business representatives and civil servants,
even where they may have shared the same ultimate goals.
A further contribution of this article is to question the narrative that the
international tax regime spread to developing countries because of their desire
to stimulate investment flows by eliminating double taxation (Baistrocchi, 2008;
Barthel & Neumayer, 2012).2 In fact, it was often the UK that initiated tax
treaty negotiations with developing countries, to place constraints on their abil-
ity to tax British investors. Negotiators from the Inland Revenue argued that
there was rarely any double taxation problem to resolve, only a concern that
developing countries might tax British investors in ways that were not
‘acceptable’, and that those firms risked ‘losing out’ to their competitors in the
absence of a treaty. The precise benefits sought by actors in the UK depended
on their familiarity with the norms formulated by the transnational commu-
nity. While non-experts were motivated by the short-run costs to British firms
associated with particular countries’ tax systems, members of the transnational
policy community were focused on exporting tax standards they had formu-
lated at the OECD. These, too, shielded their multinational firms from what
they deemed to be unacceptable features of their tax systems, but community
members’ longer-term outlook prioritized adherence to this focal point even if
that meant disadvantaging British businesses in the short-term.
The article begins by outlining the development of the international tax
regime from a state-centred perspective, focusing in particular on the relation-
ships between OECD members and non-member developing countries. It then
moves on to discussing the transnational view. Members of a transnational pol-
icy community take for granted certain focal points, which may lead them to
different preferences in the domestic context than other actors, even if they
share the same end goals. If community members have sufficient instrumental
power, the national preferences arrived at by governments may differ from
those that might be arrived at simply through analysing the presumed interests
of domestic stakeholder groups. To demonstrate this, a detailed analysis of civil
service documents from the 1970s demonstrates a business lobby group
‘speaking with two voices’: tax experts who were part of a transnational policy
community and were brought into the confidence of the Inland Revenue, and
others who were not. This polarization, which could also be found within the
civil service, was most evident in the politicization of negotiations with Brazil.
Non-expert business lobbyists used instrumental power to convince other gov-
ernment departments to lobby for an agreement, while tax community mem-
bers in the Inland Revenue and in the same business lobby group worked
together successfully to counteract this pressure. Their concern was that any
possible agreement would have run counter to the norms embodied by the
OECD model convention, the regime’s most powerful focal point.
The state-centred view of the international tax regime
The development of the international tax regime is often understood through
an ‘open economy politics’ (Lake, 2009) type lens. Governments aim to
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maximize national welfare while maintaining the support of three domestic
interest groups: labor, individual capital and corporate capital (Rixen, 2011, p.
200). In this view, business capital usually possesses the greatest instrumental
power because it has a clear and shared preference, and it prefers the allevi-
ation of double taxation (Rixen, 2010, pp. 595–6). Writing about the determi-
nants of great powers’ international tax policy, Lukas Hakelberg (2016, p.
513) points to ‘domestic constraints’ that shape a government’s incentive to
shift the tax burden between labor, consumption and capital, as well as the
impact on domestic industries’ competitiveness.
In the story advanced in most detail by Thomas Rixen (2008b, 2010,
2011), these incentives at the domestic level create a strong preference for
cooperation between states to eliminate double taxation, which at interstate
level produces a coordination game that can be resolved through a sover-
eignty-preserving regime without multilateral enforcement (see also Radaelli,
1998). The result is a global network of over 3000 bilateral tax treaties, often
called ‘double taxation agreements’, almost all of which are based directly or
indirectly on an OECD model convention (OECD, 2017). The OECD model
reflects the interests of capital exporting countries, because it imposes a solu-
tion to the double taxation problem that imposes a larger share of the costs
onto the capital importing country (Brooks & Krever, 2015; Dagan, 2000;
Genschel & Rixen, 2015; Irish, 1974; Paolini, Pistone, Pulina, & Zagler, 2016;
Thuronyi, 2010). Capital-importing developing countries nonetheless seek tax
treaties with OECD states as the price of attracting inward investment and
because they can ameliorate some of the bias through bilateral negotiations
(Barthel & Neumayer, 2012; Chisik & Davies, 2004; Hearson, 2018; Rixen &
Schwarz, 2009).3
Because they primarily constrain states’ ability to tax inward investment,
tax treaties are potential instruments of tax competition, offering inward
investors a more credible commitment to a lower effective tax rate in the
future than domestic law alone would provide (Baistrocchi, 2008; Barthel &
Neumayer, 2012). Historically, this was especially the case where a treaty pro-
vided a matching credit against home country tax for tax exempted by the
host country as an investment incentive, even though the tax had not been
paid (Hearson, 2017). Also known as ‘tax sparing’, such clauses ensured that
the benefit of any reduced taxation in the host country accrued directly to
the investor, which had no tax liability in its home country on the income
concerned. Investors able to take advantage of incentives in this way would
have significantly lower tax costs than those which were not, and there is evi-
dence such clauses significantly affected investment flows (Azemar,
Desbordes, & Mucchielli, 2007).
Rather than the revenue-maximizing motivation posited by critical legal
scholars such as Dagan (2000), capital exporting countries may therefore be
motivated by competitive pressure to conclude a wide network of tax treaties,
in order to enhance the competitive position of their outward-investing mul-
tinationals. Tax is a business cost, and so reducing it allows firms to outcom-
pete those that pay a higher rate. The form of that pressure is quite subtle,
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however, and requires an understanding of the interaction between home and
host tax systems in each case. More generally, we can see that the incorpor-
ation of developing countries into an international tax regime developed
within the League of Nations and OECD acts primarily to constrain their
ability to tax foreign investors other than in ways that its architects deemed
appropriate.
The transnational view
At the turn of the 1970s, cooperation around double taxation rested on a set
of norms developed by experts operating since the 1920s in a ‘quiet politics’
scenario (Culpepper, 2010). As Genschel and Rixen (2015, p. 163) describe,
the low political salience of international taxation from the 1930s to the
1960s had ‘allowed the experts to craft a compromise solution without major
intervention from their political principals.’ This compromise was set out in
the OECD model convention, first agreed in its modern form in 1963, and
eventually published in 1977 (Owens & Bennett, 2008). Today, the OECD
model ‘represents the general consensus on international taxation’ (Rixen,
2011, p. 207). It is a ‘focal point… defined as social conventions that are fol-
lowed ‘automatically’ because they have become self-evident’ (Rixen, 2010, p.
201). Embodied within the OECD model are a set of norms, most notably
the ‘arm’s length principle’ for allocating taxable profits between jurisdictions
(Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Yl€onen & Teivainen, 2017) which set the param-
eters of policy in the area of double taxation (Avi-Yonah, 2007). As Genschel
and Rixen (2015, p. 163) set out:
The OECD Model Convention was embedded in a broad epistemic consensus on
‘how to do double tax relief properly’, which in turn reinforced its status as the self-
evident reference point in matters of double tax relief once cross-border investments
and capital mobility started to increase in the 1970s.
While state preferences no doubt influenced the shape of this consensus,
tax historians commonly regard it as having formed among a transnational
group of technical experts (Graetz & O’Hear, 1997; Jogarajan, 2017; Picciotto,
1992). The OECD model’s ‘direct parents were… senior tax officials from
European countries’ (Owens & Bennett, 2008) and its lineage begins with the
League of Nations’ Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and
Tax Evasion (Mcintyre, Bird, & Fox, 2005; Rixen, 2008a; Vogel, 1986). The
preface to that committee’s report stresses that, ‘although the members of the
Committee are nominated by their respective Governments, they only speak
in their capacity as experts, i.e. in their own name’ (League of Nations, 1927,
p. 6).
It is already very common to describe this transnational group of experts
as an ‘epistemic community’. In the tax law literature, for example, Alison
Christians (2010b, p. 22) describes how OECD staff, civil servants represent-
ing national governments, and other professional stakeholders ‘form an inter-
twined epistemic community that holds an important and influential position
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 651
in the law-making order.’ These individuals ‘diagnose and prescribe tax policy
reforms that are informed by, and that play out within, national legal
regimes.’ Diane Ring (2006, p. 148, see also 2010, p. 681), similarly suggests
that international tax negotiations are best understood as ‘epistemically
informed bargaining’, in which an epistemic community ‘served as a driving
force in the double taxation problem, both in terms of providing a forum for
discussion and providing a base of expertise to structure the debate.’ Jason
Sharman argues that ‘[t]ax administrators are enmeshed in a trans-national
epistemic community.’ Rixen (2008a, p. 13), commenting on Webb (2006),
regards the community as being ‘comprised of tax bureaucrats and business
association representatives,’ having ‘succeeded in excluding civil society from
international tax matters by defining the issues as being ‘purely technical’
in nature.’
In its original formulation, an epistemic community is ‘a network of pro-
fessionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain
or issue’ (Haas, 1992). It is easy to see the attraction of this concept for schol-
ars of the international tax regime. Tax is a technically complex area in which
a transnational community claims a monopoly on legitimate expert know-
ledge, propounding a policy project through the process of international
standard formation that takes place in arcane committees of the OECD, but
ultimately – mostly via bilateral treaties – takes the form of national tax laws
(Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Christians, 2010b; Picciotto, 2015; Ring, 2010).
Establishing the causal links between national and international settings is,
however, a challenge for the epistemic communities literature, which has
tended to focus on demonstrating the existence of particular communities,
rather than on understanding how and in what circumstances they are able
to influence – or indeed may be influenced by – national policies
(Antoniades, 2003; Davis Cross, 2012). Haas himself suggested their influence
came mainly in times of uncertainty and crisis for policymakers, which is
unhelpful for the century-long incremental development of the international
tax regime. More useful is Haas’ notion that policy influence comes in part
through ‘infiltration’ of government bureaucracies by community members,
but this still characterizes the community as an exogenous influence on
national bureaucracies. The concept of an epistemic community is thus ill-
suited for situations in which bureaucrats themselves form part of the com-
munity, where ‘the decision makers whom members of an epistemic commu-
nity advise turn out to be themselves’ (Jacobsen, 1995, p. 302). One
possibility is to consider the internalization of community ideas by bureau-
crats through processes of ‘socialisation’, but such ideational change is empir-
ically rather difficult to measure, and likely to depend on characteristics of
the national setting, the issue area and any international organizations con-
cerned (Beyers, 2010; Johnston, 2005, 2008; Z€urn & Checkel, 2005).
A more appropriate theoretical concept is that of a transnational policy
community, which ‘refers to a group of officials, whether public or private,
that exhibits particular characteristics’ including similarities in education and
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career development, a strong sense of affinity to each other, and a set of
interests ‘defined and articulated in terms of widely accepted principles’
(Tsingou, 2014, p. 233). Such communities use club settings, in which
‘Members place a limit to the range of actors involved in the making of pol-
icy and define what type of actor is relevant’ (Tsingou, 2014, p. 231).
To characterize the international tax community in this way, we must
establish the ‘widely accepted principles’ on which its interests rest, the
mutual affinity and common characteristics of its members, and club mem-
bership rules. The departure point for such a description is the community’s
original aim of alleviating double taxation in order to promote trade and
investment. The OECD Model Convention states its own main purpose as
being ‘the application by all countries of common solutions to identical cases
of double taxation’, it being ‘scarcely necessary to stress the importance of
removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to the development of
economic relations between countries’ (OECD, 2017, p. 9). To achieve this,
the community settled on an agreed equilibrium point amongst multiple sta-
ble equilibria – the OECD Model (Rixen, 2008b) – then promoted adherence
to it. States now take care of the ‘heroic’ double taxation that motivated the
original League of Nations work through their national tax laws (Dagan,
2000), and the words ‘double taxation’ have been removed from the Model’s
title. It has instead come to embody a consensus view of how to tax cross-
border income and capital that transcends the original double taxation prob-
lem and provides the international tax community with a compelling ongoing
claim to authority.
One of the participants in the early League of Nations work, Edwin
Seligman (1928, pp. 143–144) observed that, while at first the technical
experts’ ‘concern was primarily to enter into some arrangement which would
be politically agreeable to their respective countries’:
when they learned to know each other more intimately; and especially in proportion
as they were subjected to the indefinable but friendly atmosphere of the League of
Nations, their whole attitude changed. Suspicion was converted into confidence;
doubt was resolved by the feeling of certainty of accomplishment; and aloofness
gave way to warm personal friendship which contributed materially to smoothing
out the difficulties.
According to Picciotto (1992, p. 37), ‘perhaps the most important outcome
of the inter-war years was to begin to create a community of international
tax specialists… a community within which ideas and perspectives as well as
economic advantage could be traded.’
Today, the burden of participating in numerous international meetings is
a common complaint overheard by the author among government officials
and business representatives during coffee breaks at such meetings, but it is
clear that close social relationships develop as a result. One staff member of
an organization that frequently hosts international tax meetings observed dur-
ing one such coffee break, ‘these people are friends, they stay at each other’s
houses.’4 According to a former treaty negotiator from an OECD country,
participation in OECD meetings ‘was very much a club, people didn’t want
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 653
to lose that gig, a really clubby arrangement.’5 Elements of this ‘clubbiness’
observed at international meetings include delegates’ habitual reference to
each other in formal discussions by first name, and the clearly warm nature
of informal discussions between longstanding members – regardless of their
professional affiliation – during breaks and over dinner.
In addition to this sociological proximity, the community is notable
because its membership incorporates experts from government and business,
a logical consequence of a professional environment characterized by
‘revolving doors’ (Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2009). This process began right at
the start, with Thomas Adams, the US-appointed member of the League com-
mittee, who chaired a committee for the US Chambers of Commerce as well
as participating in the International Chambers of Commerce’s work; his suc-
cessor, Mitchell Carroll, was a lawyer advising multinational firms on their
tax affairs, as well as working on behalf of the US at the League (Carroll,
1978; Graetz & O’Hear, 1997, p. 1070). Today, a large proportion of tax
advisers in the private sector have experience working in national revenue
authorities, while the senior management of the OECD secretariat’s Centre
for Tax Policy and Administration combines officials recruited from the pri-
vate and public sectors.
In the UK, for example, ‘the corporate tax reform policy community has a
tightly integrated and fairly constant membership’ leading to ‘an almost
astonishing assimilation of professional expertise to the legislative function,
born no doubt of many a congenial meeting over coffee and biscuits in
Whitehall’ (Snape, 2015, p. 89). The UK government used secondees from
Deloitte to help develop reforms to its laws surrounding taxation of multi-
national companies, who subsequently returned to the firm to advise private
clients (Lawrence, 2012). Its revenue authority has a governing board drawn
primarily from the private sector, while the UK branch of the International
Fiscal Association (IFA), ‘the leading non-governmental international organ-
ization dealing with tax matters’, counts the UK Treasury’s most senior repre-
sentative on OECD tax committees among its branch officers (IFA UK
Branch, no date). Founded by Mitchell Carroll, the IFA’s ‘membership con-
sists of high level representatives from both the private and the public
sectors’, and its 2000-strong annual conference is the largest in a packed
annual schedule of multistakeholder international tax gatherings (IFA,
no date).
Accounts of the contemporary politicization of tax politics focus on how
actors such as activist organizations who are not part of this community
attempt to influence it, and the community’s resistance to such influence
(Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Picciotto, 2015; Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016). In
particular, club membership is limited to those able ‘to accomplish the con-
version of mental space – and particularly of linguistic stance – which is pre-
sumed by entry into this social space’ (Bourdieu, 1987). For Picciotto (2015,
p. 179), in international tax, ‘law operates to defuse social conflicts and depol-
iticize them, shifting political and economic conflicts on to the terrain of
debates over the symbolic power of texts… limiting the membership of the
654 M. HEARSON
interpretative community and trying to ensure that they are like-minded.’
Non-governmental organizations, for example, have most successfully influ-
enced deliberations by adopting the mantle of expertise themselves
(Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016; Wigan & Baden, 2017).
Thus, multilateral interstate bargaining over taxation takes place through
deliberation within a transnational policy community. Differing national pref-
erences, as well as differences between governments and lobby groups, play a
role in shaping community agreement, but once consensus has been reached,
community members share the goal of advocating widespread adoption.
Bringing the national back in
The OECD model may act as a focal point within the transnational policy
community, but the self-evidence of the standards it embodies does not
always extend to political actors beyond that community. When domestic
interest group politics exerts influence on governments, experts have to
defend in the national setting a decades-old policy consensus that has been
reached at transnational level. At times, as in the US in the early 1990s,
domestic political actors have forced their governments to diverge from the
transnational consensus (Durst & Culbertson, 2003; Radaelli, 1998). In that
case, members of the policy community at the OECD ultimately shifted the
focal point to accommodate the US and maintain consensus, but not without
considerable complaint. A new wave of politicization since the financial crisis
has further increased the attention paid by political actors to international tax
rules, highlighting a divergence between public expectations and those of the
international tax community, and putting pressure on governments to diverge
from it (Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Grinberg, 2017; Rixen, 2008a).
The national politics of international tax is thus influenced by, and influ-
ences, the transnational consensus. In her study of business power in corpor-
ate tax policymaking in Latin America, Fairfield (2015, p. 11) argues that
‘administrative constraints’ and ‘technical principles’ limit the exercise of
structural and instrumental corporate power at national level. In international
tax, even at the national level, it is the OECD Model that provides the tech-
nical language, norms, standards and guidelines that frame debate. The model
certainly delimits the set of acceptable options in the minds of policymakers,
to the extent that it is argued to have a ‘soft law’ status (Avi-Yonah, 2007).
Grinberg (2017) argues that, ‘at least within the OECD, tax treaty negotiators
feel substantially constrained to accept OECD Model Treaty provisions in
their future negotiations with other sovereigns’. Sadiq (2012, p. 132) charac-
terizes the process of international tax policymaking in Australia as follows:
‘the Australian Federal Government inherently accepts the existence of an
international tax regime and adopts both the international tax policy and
practice aspects embodied in that regime through its domestic rules and dou-
ble tax treaties’. This is also the case outside the OECD, where OECD instru-
ments may be referred to by courts, and where policymakers may feel
constrained to follow international best practice (Baistrocchi, 2008; Brauner,
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2003; Christians, 2010a; Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008). Nonetheless, OECD tax
standards only become hard law when assimilated into the tax codes of indi-
vidual states (Christians, 2007). Bilateral tax treaties are the main means
through which this occurs.
Thus, transnational soft law formation and inter-state treaty negotiations
must be considered as interrelated parts of the same process, with multiple
entry points for actors seeking to influence the international tax regime. The
process of tax treaty negotiation, from the initial policy considerations
through to ratification, is guided in almost every country by a small team of
specialist bureaucrats, many of whom also take part in the international
bodies that formulate the models. For example, the British negotiators whose
names appear in the files discussed below are also listed as participants in
minutes of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs or its OEEC predeces-
sors, and its United Nations equivalent. The same can be said of their private
sector counterparts.
Domestic interest group politics meets transnational expertise in
the United Kingdom
The rest of this article is based on an analysis of bilateral treaty negotiations
between the UK and countries outside of the OECD during the 1970s, using
archived civil service documentation. The UK played a very involved role in
the development of the League of Nations and OECD model conventions
(Avery Jones, 2011), and the UK-US treaty of 1945 is regarded as having set
the precedent for modern tax treaties (Graetz & O’Hear, 1997). It has been
the most active negotiator of any country, with the widest treaty network in
the world (IBFD, no date).
Despite this active role, the preferences of UK negotiators and the content
of the OECD model convention have not always been identical. As noted ear-
lier, the OECD model has a bias towards allocating taxing rights to capital
exporting states, but it still permits some taxation by capital importing states
of some forms of income. During the interwar period, the British expert, Sir
Percy Thompson, Deputy Chair of Board of the Inland Revenue, had opposed
this compromise at the League of Nations, arguing that only the home state
should have the right to tax the foreign income of its multinational taxpayers
(Graetz & O’Hear, 1997; Jogarajan, 2017). In the 1950s, the Inland Revenue
was opposed to the creation of a fiscal committee at the OEEC, the predeces-
sor of the OECD, but British diplomats concluded that ‘in our position in the
organization it would be tactically unwise’ to try to veto it (Ellis-Rees, 1956).
Over the next twenty years, the UK participated actively in the elaboration of
an OECD model that reflected much, but not all, of its treaty making prac-
tice. In an exhaustive technical review of the text of the OECD model and its
predecessors, Avery Jones (2011, p. 682) concludes that the UK ‘had only a
meagre effect on the final result.’ The enthusiasm with which UK negotiators
cleaved to the focal point of the OECD model convention thus reflects their
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acceptance of a compromise struck in transnational forums over sev-
eral decades.
This article focuses on the 1970s, the most recent decade for which civil
service records are available in the National Archives. During this period, the
UK was in talks with at least 38 developing countries, concluding treaties
with 16 by the end of 1980. The UK National Archives’ database of files was
searched for the terms ‘double tax’ and ‘tax treaty’, yielding 2301 results. The
majority of these were country-specific files originated from the Inland
Revenue or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its predecessors.
They include internal civil service correspondence, correspondence between
countries, and minutes of negotiation meetings. This means that they include
both the internal thinking of the UK and the positioning of the negotiating
partner, supplemented on occasions by intelligence about its motivations.
There are also some files relating to the UK’s general negotiating position,
and quarterly ‘state of play’ reports on all the UK’s negotiations.
This section outlines the roles and motivations of different groups of
stakeholders in the decision-making processes surrounding the UK’s tax trea-
ties. First, it examines the preferences of tax treaty specialists in the Inland
Revenue, who led negotiations, and their interlocutors in businesses. These
actors saw the function of tax treaties as the dissemination of OECD tax
standards beyond the OECD. Other actors in the rest of government and
business did not share this point of view, and instead focused on the narrow
objective of lowering British firms’ effective tax rate. This conflict is illus-
trated in further detail by analysing conflict between these two groups over
the UK’s negotiations with Brazil.
Transnational policy community members: disseminating
OECD standards
For officials inside the Inland Revenue, the major causal effect of tax treaties
was not, despite their formal title, the elimination of double taxation. The
reason for this was that the UK, in common with many other countries, had
taken unilateral steps to prevent double taxation of its firms operating over-
seas, by giving them a credit against their UK tax bill for any taxes paid over-
seas. Recognition of this dates back at least to 1957, when an Inland Revenue
civil servant wrote that with regard to one treaty, ‘the United Kingdom tax-
payer gets very little benefit out of it: he will get credit for the tax paid in
Colombia against the tax due on the same income in this country whether
we have an agreement or not’ (Daymond, 1957). Two decades later, in 1976,
a cross-department review of the UK’s approach to international double tax-
ation, led by the Inland Revenue, made the case even more boldly: ‘in the
absence of an agreement there is no question of United Kingdom investors
being doubly taxed’ (Double Taxation Relief, 1976).6
What then was the purpose of a tax treaty for the Inland Revenue? That
same note from 1957 records that, for a board of Directors in the UK, ‘the
advantages of a double taxation [agreement] need no stressing’ because it ‘at
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once assures the directors that they will be taxed according to internationally
accepted rules and they will not be subject to discrimination.’ (Daymond,
1957). These ‘intangible benefits’ are mentioned by government officials
throughout the period under consideration, and according to the 1976 review
they ‘include protection against fiscal discrimination, the establishment of a
framework within which the two tax administrations can operate, and the
expectation that an overseas authority which has negotiated a treaty will at
least try to apply it reasonably’ (Double Taxation Relief, 1976).
The Deputy Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue in 1976 was Alan
Lord, who twenty years previously had represented the UK on the new
OEEC committee that would eventually become the OECD’s Committee on
Fiscal Affairs. According to him: ‘Above all, treaties impose acceptable stand-
ards for allocating profits to branches and subsidiaries and for dealing with
transfer pricing in countries (some of them within the EEC) where such
standards would otherwise be absent’ (Lord, 1967).
For the specialists, tax treaties were tools through which the UK, which
had always taken a prominent role in the development of the international
tax system, ensured the participation of other countries in it. This would be
especially beneficial for British businesses in the case of developing countries,
including those newly independent, where, as one official wrote, ‘protection
against fiscal discrimination is generally worth more… because they are more
likely to include deliberately discriminatory fiscal practices in their general
law than are developed countries’ (Wilkinson, 1976a). A memo from as early
as 1949 expresses the view that ‘The United Kingdom particularly has much
to gain from the increasing adoption, particularly by under-developed coun-
tries, of sound principles of income taxation and from the conclusion on
sound lines of conventions for the relief of double taxation’ (Morton, 1949).
Treaties were therefore understood as means to ensure that British firms
could be competitive when they decided to invest, rather than to make invest-
ment in the treaty partner more attractive in the first place. This would mean
that treaties increased investment from the UK to the treaty partner, but not
usually by influencing business decisions; rather, they gave British investors a
helping hand.
The effect of treaties on outward investment from the UK was not a trivial
matter during the 1970s, but an important policy question. Treasury policy
was to limit the impact of outward FDI on the balance of payments by
encouraging it to be done out of retained earnings, investment currency or
foreign currency borrowing. In 1973, at a meeting of the cross-Whitehall Tax
Reform Committee handling changes to corporation tax, a Treasury official
argued against measures that would prioritize overseas investment, because of
the effect on the balance of payments. The concern was about foreign
exchange reserves, which could be protected more through income from
exports than from direct investment; furthermore, the likely shift in manufac-
turing abroad as a result of overseas investment would increase imports
(Hopkins, 1973).
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Discussing this point, the 1976 review concluded that the treaty network
at that point ‘neither encourages nor discourages overseas investment in fiscal
terms compared with domestic investment, except where matching credit is
provided’ (Double Taxation Relief, 1976). At around this time the Inland
Revenue was arguing against conceding Brazil’s demands for more compre-
hensive concessions in a tax treaty on the grounds that the concessions,
‘would mean that we were according outward investment a higher priority
than hitherto with all that that implied for the balance of payments and the
domestic economy’ (Hubbard, 1974).
The community of tax specialists who shared this analysis and these objec-
tives was not limited to the Revenue itself, in at least one respect: it extended
into the private sector. In December 1971, Alan Davies of Rio Tinto Zinc,
chair of the CBI’s tax committee, wrote to Alan Lord. The letter outlined the
limitations of the Revenue’s current approach to consultation, which was to
solicit comments from industry by letter once negotiations were initiated.
Davies cited ‘a peeved feeling on our side that some more confidence would
be justified,’ and argued for more informal discussion about the progress of
negotiations (Davies, 1971). The informal tone of Davies’ letter perhaps
reflects a personal familiarity with the Inland Revenue officials concerned.
For example, he attended meetings of the United Nations Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries, repre-
senting the International Chambers of Commerce, as did Inland Revenue
negotiators (United Nations, 1969, 1970).
The result was a system of regular quarterly meetings between the Inland
Revenue and tax specialists from industry groups at which detailed informa-
tion on the ‘state of play’ in negotiations was divulged, and comments sought
on specific topics (Minutes of Meetings with Confederation of British
Industry on double taxation, 1971–1981). The first such meeting took place
in March 1972, and they continued for at least the next decade. At each
meeting, the Inland Revenue participants were supplied with a status report
on current and planned negotiations, which they shared verbally with the
business representatives on condition that the information was not shared
outside of the small, expert group. When negotiations reached a difficult
point, the matters of contention would often be discussed in this forum.
Conflict with political actors
Here I consider the preferences of non-community members, for whom tax
treaties were also tools to increase the competitiveness of British firms
abroad. A lack of detailed taxation knowledge, frequently lamented both by
them and by the specialists, would lead to conflicts, during which the
Revenue would sometimes try to persuade them that their faith in the effect
of tax treaties was misplaced. ‘There can be little doubt that tax treaties are a
means of stimulating trade and investment between the treaty partner
countries,’ wrote the private secretary to the Treasury minister responsible for
tax policy in 1976. ‘On the other hand their importance is sometimes
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 659
exaggerated’ (Wilkinson, 1976b). The UK’s lead negotiator noted in 1974,
referring to Brazil, that,
we should not over emphasise the importance of a DTA. It generally only affects
income flowing from one country to another whereas in the short term a company
will not remit much in the way of profits and will not be too bothered in the
absence of an agreement (Note of Meeting, 1974), emphasis in original.
Most civil service non-specialists who engaged with tax treaty matters dur-
ing the 1970s wanted British firms that were eligible for investment-promot-
ing tax relief in developing countries to receive a corresponding credit (often
referred to as ‘tax sparing’ credit) against UK tax, to ensure that they could
retain the benefit of the tax relief when they repatriated their profits. As the
1976 review notes, in outlining the priorities of different departments, ‘the
main cash benefit for the investor [from a tax treaty] is matching credit for
pioneer reliefs’ (Double Taxation Relief, 1976). The difficulty was that this
was not the Inland Revenue’s priority from tax treaties, and at times (as the
case of Brazil illustrates) the two priorities even came into conflict.
The Inland Revenue sought to keep input from other departments limited
and compartmentalized, and did not welcome their attempts to influence its
priorities. The Treasury, Departments of Trade and Industry, and Foreign
Office would each be consulted on treaties once negotiations were opened,
and on specific questions concerning their content, but the Revenue would
often rebuff their requests to be able to influence its priorities.
During late 1972 and 1973, an extraordinary correspondence opened up
between the FCO and the Board of Trade on one hand, and the Inland
Revenue on the other. The former were frustrated by their inability to influ-
ence the latter’s negotiating priorities. At a cross-Whitehall meeting in April
1972, the Revenue had merely invited them to submit ‘shopping lists’ for
treaties they would like it to negotiate (Note of Meeting, 1972). ‘We have
already forfeited opportunities for investment in Brazil, notably to the
Germans and Japan and, as a matter of commercial policy, it is important
that we should not place our traders at a disadvantage when seeking out
investment opportunities in the future,’ argued one official from the Board of
Trade in February 1973 (Gill, 1973). He continued that:
As you know, we have been concerned that the corporation tax system should not
so limit the scope for tax sparing as to damage the UK’s ability to export to and
invest in developing (and highly competitive) overseas markets. For this reason, we
place great importance on the conclusion, as quickly as possible, of double tax
agreements with our developing trading partners which allow for tax sparing.
The Revenue resisted this pressure, refusing even to share a list of current
negotiating priorities or negotiations that were underway, because ‘a high
degree of confidentiality attaches to our negotiations with particular
countries’ (Smallwood, 1973). The reference to confidentiality is revealing,
because this correspondence took place at the same time as the Revenue had
begun quarterly meetings with tax specialists from businesses, at which
exactly this information was disclosed.
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‘I find the Inland Revenue’s attitude and behavior quite extraordinary,’
wrote an official in the FCO’s financial relations department, as part of cor-
respondence that passed between these other departments. ‘I cannot imagine
that any other department in Whitehall would behave in this way. Nor would
we have allowed any other Department to get away with behavior like this
for quite so long. I am quite clear we must call a halt now’ (Kerr, 1973a).
Another lamented ‘a dispiriting and unfruitful confrontation with the Inland
Revenue’ (Baillie, 1972). The problem for the FCO, in particular, was that it
lacked a coherent position within itself, and the technical expertise to develop
one. ‘The subject is difficult and mastering it is undoubtedly time-consuming’
mused one FCO official (Kerr, 1973b).
It was not only officials from other departments who had trouble influenc-
ing Inland Revenue officials: their own ministers faced the same problem. In
general, politicians had little involvement in tax treaties at all. At the start of
the 1970s, negotiators worked within enabling powers set by parliament, and
would only seek ministerial guidance when making a concession that had not
previously been given in negotiations. There seems to have been no political
involvement in the decision with whom to negotiate, and the minister in
charge, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, did not usually have sight of
a treaty until bringing it before parliament for ratification.
The technical complexity of tax treaties was inevitably a barrier to effective
political scrutiny, but this must surely have been combined with the short
tenure of Financial Secretaries: eleven different people occupied the position
during the 1960s and 1970s, with an average tenure of two years.7 The lon-
gest serving, Robert Sheldon, was in post from February 1975 to April 1979.
The archives demonstrate the difficulty faced by a minister trying to exert
some influence over a policy area with which he was unfamiliar. During the
mid-1970s, the UK had been seeking to amend its treaties to reflect changes
to its corporation tax system. The civil servant who first briefed Sheldon
commented that:
I got the impression that he does not realise – or did not until I pointed it out to
him – that double taxation agreements also deal with other matters than
dividends… . he seemed surprised when I told him we had sixty plus agreements in
operation (Collins, 1975).
This lack of understanding is also apparent in the minute of the May 1976
meeting. Sheldon questioned ‘what the OECD Model was and what we would
do if it turned out not to provide an advantageous pattern for the UK’ (Note
of Meeting, 1976). This question illustrates that the OECD model’s status
among officials as a focal point in negotiations was not shared by the
Minister who supervised them, after more than a year in post.
A third category of non-specialist stakeholder was those within businesses,
who were able to influence the positions of other parts of government includ-
ing the FCO and DTI, but rarely to translate this into treaties. Geographic
departments in the FCO, in particular, were often persuaded by businesses,
which lobbied British embassies, to advocate new British tax treaties. For
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example, ‘UK finance houses and business interests are adamant that we are
losing a significant amount of business in Spain because there is no double
taxation agreement,’ wrote an official in the FCO’s Southern Europe depart-
ment (Baillie, 1973). These positions fed into the central FCO departments,
in particular the economists’ department and financial relations department,
which as we have seen were furious that the Inland Revenue would not heed
their concerns about the competitiveness of British businesses. Meanwhile,
the Inland Revenue seemed content to divide and rule the geographical
departments.
Business lobbying via these departments met with limited success, partly
because those other parts of government had limited influence on the
Revenue, but also because one part of the private sector undermined the
other, a fault line that sometimes ran within, rather than between, businesses.
A memo from the CBI to the Department of Trade and Industry in 1974,
covering a wide range of policy and not written by tax specialists, states that
tax treaty ‘negotiations should not be left exclusively to the Inland Revenue
(whose main concern is naturally the minimization of losses to the
Exchequer)’ (CBI, 1974). A year later, an Inland Revenue official was
‘subjected to a 2 h intense grilling’ by CBI representatives who were not tax
specialists at a cross-Whitehall consultative meeting. They had apparently
suggested that future negotiations for double taxation agreements would bet-
ter be dealt with by a department other than the Inland Revenue since the
negotiations were currently carried out for the United Kingdom by narrow
specialists who were so blinkered by the technicalities of taxation that they
failed to see the full view of the picture (Minutes of a meeting with
Representatives of the Confederation of British Industry, 1975).
The CBI delegation also expressed the view that the Inland Revenue’s con-
sultation with tax experts from industry ‘was not really satisfactory since it
was restricted to “taxmen” (ibid). Those ‘taxmen’ felt obliged to apologize for
their colleagues’ actions in subsequent discussions with the Inland Revenue
(ibid; Moran, 1975b).
To summarize the argument so far, the UK’s national preference was
formed by civil servants in the Inland Revenue, informed primarily by the
lobbying efforts of fellow tax specialists within business. For these two
groups, all members of the international tax community, treaties were a
means to disseminate ‘acceptable’ tax standards, which would protect UK
businesses from what they saw as unfair taxation. This was a long-term pro-
ject that required sticking closely to the focal point of the OECD Model.
Their efforts were held in tension with the interests of other elements of
British businesses, who lobbied elsewhere in government, successfully con-
verting civil servants and Ministers to their cause, but largely failing to con-
vince the Inland Revenue. For them, tax treaties were a means to secure tax
sparing credits and other concessions that would reduce the effective tax rate
of British firms, enhancing their competitive position. For neither group were
the aims of eliminating double taxation and retaining the UK’s share of the
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tax base, supposedly the driving force behind the creation of the international
tax regime, the main motivating factors.
The case of the UK–Brazil treaty
The UK devoted far more time and effort to negotiations with Brazil during
the 1970s than almost any other developing country, and yet an agreement
was never concluded. Talks in 1967 had failed, but they were taken up again
from 1972, urged by British businesses keen to benefit from Brazil’s
‘economic miracle’ (Double Taxation Relief Agreement, 1974).8 In 1976, how-
ever, talks were suspended in spite of the fact that, as the Inland Revenue
acknowledged, ‘it is British investors who will be the sufferers’ (Wilkinson,
1976b). It is hard to explain this from a simple state-centric, domestic interest
group perspective, since there was strong pressure from business lobby
groups for an agreement, and little interest group opposition. A transnational
expertise perspective appears more suited to the case, since the British pos-
ition was that it could only conclude an agreement with Brazil ‘providing for
significant amelioration of aspects of their tax code that run clearly counter
to OECD principles; and if they are not interested, so be it’ (Wilkinson,
1976b). This nonetheless poses the question why non-expert interest group
pressure was ineffective in the UK, when several other OECD countries had
accepted Brazil’s non-OECD terms.
The stalemate between the UK and Brazil concerned two unconventional
demands by the latter. It insisted that the UK grant extensive ‘tax sparing’
concessions. This would mean crediting the value of a Brazilian tax exemp-
tion against the UK company’s tax bill as if it had paid full Brazilian tax. It
would also mean doing the same for the reductions in taxes on cross-border
payments that were built into the treaty. In the reported words of a Brazilian
negotiator, ‘whilst Brazil does not want the United Kingdom to lose tax, she
cannot allow the United Kingdom to collect more tax as a result of the con-
vention’ (Note of Talks in Brazilia, 1974). Such a concession required new
legislation in the UK, to which the UK eventually conceded in 1976.
The second Brazilian demand was more difficult, however. Under
Brazilian domestic law, firms had to pay a withholding tax on the gross value
of any royalty paid to a foreign recipient. Unusually, however, they were not
then permitted to deduct the value of the royalty payments when calculating
their net profits. As a result, they effectively paid tax on the payments a
second time in Brazil, through income tax. While the UK’s unilateral double
tax relief system gave investors a credit for taxes paid abroad, the high effect-
ive rate exceeded this credit, and so the company bore the cost, reducing its
competitiveness. Brazil insisted that any double taxation agreement leave this
state of affairs intact, though it was in direct contravention of the OECD
model’s provisions. As noted in an Inland Revenue memo, several OECD
countries had reached agreements with Brazil that permitted this practice to
continue, because other concessions obtained in treaty negotiations, such as
lower withholding tax rates, gave their firms a competitive advantage
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 663
(Wilkinson, 1976b). This both increased the pressure on the Inland Revenue
from British businesses and reduced its leverage in negotiations with Brazil.
British companies ‘are undoubtedly at a competitive disadvantage as com-
pared with companies from other countries,’ noted a background brief in
August 1974 (Double Taxation Relief Agreement, 1974).
The pressure from businesses did not come directly on the Inland Revenue,
but via other ministries. In October 1974, a memo from the Department of
Industry to the Inland Revenue pressed the case for a treaty, citing ‘specific evi-
dence of orders being lost by British companies apparently because of their rela-
tively lower post-tax returns forcing them to quote higher prices in
compensation.’ With no movement by December, the Department of Trade
weighed in, beginning a correspondence between its Secretary of State, Peter
Shore, and Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey (Shore, 1974).9
As the pressure from business lobbyists on other government departments
ratcheted up, tax specialists within British businesses reassured the Revenue
that they were broadly in agreement with its view that the Brazilian terms
were unacceptable (Harvey, 1976). A note of a meeting between tax specialists
at the Inland Revenue and CBI records how a CBI representative was
well aware of the powerful trade and political pressures in favor of having an
agreement (apparently any agreement) with Brazil which he thought could lead to
an explosion in the autumn. His personal view was that the Revenue and Treasury
Ministers could be under pressures from other Ministers which might lead to an
agreement, in spite of the unsatisfactory features that had been discussed. Much of
the pressure is based on ignorance of the effects of unilateral relief and of the likely
terms of a treaty (Smallwood, 1975, emphasis in original).
Minutes of the meeting and a follow-up letter from the CBI record the
industry tax experts’ frustration at being unable to correct their colleagues’
‘ignorance’ because of the confidential nature of their meetings with the
Inland Revenue (Moran, 1975a). Inland Revenue memos contrast the ‘non-
fiscal voices’ within the CBI with those of ‘the CBI’s Tax Committee, as a
Committee of tax experts’ (Wilkinson, 1976b) and observe that, ‘the CBI will
no doubt have to consider how to deal with the situation in which it is speak-
ing with two voices’ (Smallwood, 1975).
In 1976, British negotiators were able to travel to Brasilia with their new legis-
lative mandate on tax sparing and instructions ‘to refrain from agreeing to the
unacceptable features of Brazilian law which they wish to enshrine in the treaty,
but to avoid a breakdown in the talks’ (Crosland, 1976). The Brazil files stop at
the turn of the 1980s, but the same debate continues. In 1992, an Inland
Revenue official wrote that ‘Brazil continues to be the big prize: but it is not ripe
for an immediate approach and what indications there are suggest that it will be
a difficult nut to crack’ (Shepherd, 1992). The absence of a treaty with Brazil is
still raised by British business lobby groups today, and the UK and Brazil still do
not agree on terms (House of Commons, 2014).
The debate over the UK-Brazil tax treaty illustrates that the preferences and
instrumental power of corporate capital in the UK were not monolithic, but varied
depending on technical knowledge. Had the aim of the UK’s tax treaty negotiations
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been simply to give British firms a competitive edge by lowering their effective tax
rate in Brazil, as British firms in Brazil were lobbying for via the British embassy
and the Departments for Trade and Industry, an agreement would have been pos-
sible. But it would have come at the cost of implicitly endorsing Brazil’s approach to
taxing royalty payments. This would have undermined the longer-term project of
exporting norms embodied in the focal point of the OECDmodel, which motivated
members of the international tax community both in the Inland Revenue and
in businesses.
Conclusions
The expansion of the UK’s tax treaty network to non-OECD countries during
the 1970s was part of a major growth of the international tax regime. The
state-centric view of the regime’s development explains this expansion as a
response to developing countries’ concerns that double taxation might under-
mine their efforts to attract British investment. Yet investors’ concerns about
double taxation did not determine the UK’s preferences. The critical law
account (Dagan, 2000; Irish, 1974), in which the UK is motivated by a desire
to capture a greater share of tax revenues from British companies operating
in developing countries, is also inconsistent with the evidence. Rather, offi-
cials from the public and private sector who had been complicit in the cre-
ation of OECD standards at transnational level used tax treaties as means to
disseminate those standards. More than eliminating double taxation, the aim
was to constrain other countries’ ability to tax inward investment. This long-
term project required a disciplined focus on establishing the hegemonic pos-
ition of OECD standards, even if this meant abandoning negotiations that
British businesses were lobbying for, but which could only be concluded at
the cost of the purity of the OECD standards.
Familiarity with this focal point determined the preferences of individual
actors, but it also determined their capabilities to translate those preferences
into the government position. Private sector officials who were members of the
transnational tax community were influential in decisions made by the Inland
Revenue. Information readily supplied to them was at the same time withheld
from government officials from other departments, and from business actors
without a tax specialist background. Even the government minister supervising
tax officials was unable to exert influence because he lacked familiarity with
transnational norms. This explanation based on bureaucratic politics and tech-
nical knowledge concurs with Poulsen’s (2015) account of the diffusion of bilat-
eral investment treaties, but shifts the focus onto capital-exporting states.
Since the 1970s, international tax standards have become considerably
more complex, but the OECD model bilateral tax treaty remains at the heart
of current reforms to tackle tax competition (OECD, 2013). The challenges
encountered in the process of these reforms partly reflect the conflicting pref-
erences of different groups of states (Eccleston & Smith, 2016; Grinberg,
2016; Hakelberg, 2016), and partly reflect the politics of tax expertise within
the transnational policy community (Buttner & Thiemann, 2017; Picciotto,
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2015; Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016). This article has demonstrated that these
two streams of scholarship need to be merged, to consider how expertise pol-
itics influences national preferences.
Recognizing the role of expertise as well as interest group politics in deriving
national preferences opens up a new perspective on the development of the
international tax regime, and calls for a re-examination of corporate power in
international taxation. The implicit assumption of interstate bargaining models
is structural corporate power in the form of market pressure on states to com-
pete for inward investment (Arel-Bundock, 2017; Barthel & Neumayer, 2012). If
bilateral tax treaty negotiations are a continuation of transnational standard-set-
ting on which business actors exert some influence, and if businesses actors’
preferences and capabilities at national level vary on the basis of their expertise,
then a more comprehensive view of the exercise of corporate power is needed.
Notes
1. An exception is the US, where domestic political actors have repeatedly
blocked participation in OECD initiatives (Hakelberg, 2016; Sharman, 2006;
Webb, 2004).
2. The evidence for an investment-promoting effect in developing countries is,
however, mixed (Barthel, Busse, & Neumayer, 2009; Davies, Norb€ack, & Tekin-
Koru, 2009; Lejour 2014; Sauvant & Sachs, 2009).
3. The evidence for the investment-promoting effect in developing countries is,
however, mixed (Barthel et al., 2009; Davies et al., 2009; Lejour, 2014; Sauvant
& Sachs, 2009).
4. Interview, Amsterdam, 2015.
5. Skype Interview, 2016.
6. There are exceptions illustrated in the files. For example, businesses that
incurred withholding taxes on management fees abroad would find that, absent
a treaty, these tax payments would not qualify for a credit against UK tax.
7. According to biographies on the UK parliament website, tenure during the
period covered by this chapter was as follows: Dick Taverne, 1968–1970;
Bernard Jenkin, 1970–1972; Terence Higgins, 1972–1973; John Gilbert,
1974–1975; Robert Sheldon, 1975–1979; Nigel Lawson, 1979–1981.
8. The same civil service files include a clipping from the Financial Times
discussing Brazil’s “economic miracle”.
9. In 1974 the Department of Trade and Industry was split into two separate
departments.
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